Kelshall praises Theodore: He was in command of the situation
JADA LOUTOO THURSDAY 15 SEPTEMBER 2011
Kelshall also specially commended former Chief of Defence Staff, Brigadier Joseph Theodore.
His commendation came amidst criticisms being levelled against the army at the Commission of Enquiry investigating the circumstances surrounding the insurrection.
In singling out the role Theodore played as chief hostage negotiator — which was foisted upon him by accident — Kelshall, in his testimony at the enquiry, said the former Chief of Defence Staff worked ceaselessly and that if he had to pin a hero, it would be Theodore.
Kelshall is a former Strategic Security Agency (SSA) director who received naval training at the Britannia Royal Naval College in Devon, England, and who was also trained in Canada in hostage negotiations.
He said a senior officer negotiating with the insurgents was a “no no” and went against all the teachings on hostage negotiations.
“The rule book went out the window,” he admitted. But, he said, “it worked”.
Theodore is expected to testify today before the commission.
Theodore, Kelshall said, had the situation under control and on one occasion when he took the phone, the voice on the other end said if Theodore was not put back on the line, “people will die.”
“Whatever system he was using, was working. The people on the other end were calling him ‘Sir’. He was in command of the situation,” Kelshall said, noting that the former Chief of Defence Staff was even giving orders to the insurgents.
Asked by lead counsel to the Commission, Avery Sinanan, SC, if the situation was “diffused by accident,” Kelshall emphatically said “No.”
He said despite the unconventional means used to diffuse the situation, “it came out right and that was the most important thing.”
Kelshall also noted that he would say “whoever made the most goals win.”
“Did we win? Yes and we owe a debt of gratitude to the Regiment,” he said.
Commission chairman Sir David Simmons also noted that although processes “were not followed”, at the end there was a “good result.”
Kelshall also praised the army for taking control of the surrender of the Jamaat al Muslimeen insurgents, who had held several parliamentarians captive, including former Prime Minister Arthur NR Robinson and staff at Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT) studios.
He said while the surrender was an “army thing” and he did not get involved, what he saw was the “professional and disciplined fire control” exhibited by the army.
He said he was told by admirals all over the world that it was the only surrender scenario that did not involve a bloodbath. It needed one “hot head” to fire a shot and it would have escalated into a terrible situation, he said.
“The Regiment performed immaculately at the time,” he added.
Kelshall said while the soldiers were in “the fog of war”, which led to some confusion, they acted professionally and all the troops involved must be commended “for a job well done”.
He said the July 1990 attempted coup was no ordinary event especially for a country which was considered to be a “gentle and peaceful place in those days.”
Kelshall, as he was led into evidence by counsel for the Defence Force, Wayne Armour, also noted that his former hostage negotiation tutor, Professor Harvey Schlossberg, said he never saw anything like it before and did not know what to do. He said Schlossberg could not provide him with any advice, but did say that the insurgency was “too big” and will “implode on itself” and that the best thing to do was to keep the insurgents contained. Kelshall said the attempted coup was viewed as the largest hostage situation the world had seen, with two separate hostage-taking sites.
He said while there were basic military rules of engagement to be followed, because the country was in a clear and present danger, formalities had to be pushed aside.
As he testified during the fifth session of the enquiry, Kelshall also revealed that in 1997, he was mandated by former Prime Minister Basdeo Panday to create a Joint Operation Command Centre (JOCC) — which saw the coming together of all the local security agencies under one roof, sharing intelligence — but that this was later disbanded by the People’s National Movement in 2000/2001, when the United National Congress left office.
Kelshall said if the security forces had a similar operation in 1990, communication, which he said was the major flaw in the successful engagement, would not have been an issue and they would not have experienced the confusion they did during the insurgency.
He said it would have also prevented the “blue on blue” (firing of law enforcement officers on each other). He said the JOCC was extremely successful.
Kelshall noted that no legislative framework was needed for the JOCC as long as the various security units carried out their duties with no one unit taking command.
He said the current state of emergency has demonstrated the need for a similar type of centre to be reestablished. And in response to a question from the Commission’s chairman, he said the establishment of smaller JOCCs throughout the region would assist in the fight against the arms and drug trade.
While admitting there were many failures during the 1990 attempted coup with the major problem being the lack of communication, Kelshall said there was no right or wrong.
“No one knew what was going on. For a little country, one expected some sort of confusion.” he said.
Kelshall also bemoaned the lack of recognition given to the non-military personnel who participated in the insurgency.
He said the National Helicopter Services (NHS) pilots, all civilians who assisted the Coast Guard, were never recognised for their service, which included reconnaissance and anti-looting operations.
The Cadet Force was also part of the complement of volunteers who were also not recognised and this, he said, was a sore point for him.
Kelshall also commented on another critical aspect of the insurgency, which was raised by National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister, Gary Griffith, on Tuesday — that there was chaos at Camp Ogden which was used as the army’s base of operations.
Kelshall described Camp Ogden as a collection point, “where stragglers (soldiers) arrived and had to be sorted out.”
He said the situation eventually sorted itself out.
Some of his sailors were among the fighters who donned camouflages and were sent out on the firing line, without him even being told, he said.
“I should have been (told),” he admitted. Several sailors, following the attempted coup, were charged and were hauled before the Rear Admiral to account for their absence from base during the insurrection, and were discharged after it became known they were on the front-line with the troops.
Kelshall said he was also not told that the military command centre had moved from Camp Ogden to the Trinidad Hilton. He eventually found out.